Three hundred years ago England was a Christian Godfearing nation whose subjects accepted that they were God's creation. Their bodies and souls were subject to God's will, but God's mainly male representatives on earth frequently intervened to take a hand. Heretics and witches were burned, the evil slave trade prospered, women and children were their husband's chattels and the theft of a loaf of bread could warrant transportation. However, mayhem' and suicide (regarded as self-murder), were felonies -serious criminal offences.' Mayhem remains unlawful-it is against public policy, that notoriously elusive chameleonwith society's representatives, i.e. its judges, setting limits on the extent of injury to which any individual can give a valid and lawful consent, though suicide has been lawful since 1961. 3 Meantime pregnant women continue to fight for equal rights to control what may be done to their bodies against their wishes."
While a human being is alive and of age and capacity, he has control over his body in the UK. He can donate non-essential or replaceable bone, fluids and tissue for altruistic purposes; he can offer his body or its parts of it for use when he is dead.' He may, not in the UK, however, trade, barter or sell his body or its parts.v' for use during his lifetime or posthumously," Any such deal would be potentially criminal? and also unenforceable. There is a right to custody and possession of a body by those with legal responsibility for its interment until it is properly buried but it is, or was, a fundamental precept of English law that there is no property in a dead body or part of a dead body. 10 However, as Peter Gibson LJ noted in the recent Court ofAppeal case of Dobson v North Tyneside HA, [1997] 8 Med LR 357 at 360,: "this bare statement needs some qualification" -it is tempting to insert the word freshly before the word "dead" and have done with it. But this would not cover all potential situations. What if the body or its parts were immediately 45 embalmed or treated or fixed in some way and then not buried? And if it is buried but is later retrieved? How much later before it can be displayed in a museum as property?
The starting point is the Australian case of Doodeward v Spence [1906] CLR 406, when the preserved fetus of a two-headed child stillborn 40 years earlier, was held to be property. The appellant, who had bought it with a view to displaying it for gain around the country, successfully recovered it in an action for detinue against the police but his plans to exhibit it were held to offend public decency. Griffith CJ, accepted that it was not unlawful to possess a mummy or a prepared skeleton or a skull or other parts of the human body and referred to the collections of specimens maintained by scientific bodies for scientific and educational purposes world-wide. Accordingly, he concluded that a human body, or a portion of it, was capable of becoming property in the following circumstances:
"a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a human body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right to retain possession of it, at least as against any person not entitled to have it delivered to him for the purpose of burial"
And to this limited extent he was supported by one of his two brother judges. The other dissented completely.
Ninety years later, an English Court of Appeal considered this important issue for the first time in Dobson," After reviewing Doodeward v Spence it concluded that while it was "arguable" that a human body or body part which had been inter alia embalmed, stuffed or fixed might become "property", a brain that had been fixed in paraffin, stored, then destroyed or lost, was not! The action was for production of the brain or damages in lieu. It was brought by the next of kin of a young mother who had been diagnosed as suffering from a brain tumour shortly before her death. Her brain was removed during a post-mortem ordered by a coroner, but not sectioned for histological examination," though apparently this was the pathologist's intention and usual practice. 13 The Court's reluctance to "impose a duty on hospitals to retain tissue removed in a post-mortem against the possibility that it might be used in future litigation"!" was probably responsible for its flawed reasoning. This also avoided the need to deal with the tricky issue of ownership, given that there had been no intended abandonment of the brain by the next of kin which had been retained when the body was returned for burial.
It is significant that, last month, a different court of Appeal (which had not been referred to Dobson) came to a quite opposite conclusion when considering the criminal appeals of R v Kelly and R v Lindsay on May 14, 1998.J5 The defendants were convicted of the theft of some 35 human body parts from the Royal College of Surgeons." The trial judge had interpreted Doodeward v Spence'! as investing a human body or its parts with the status of property which was capable of being owned (and thus stolen) if it was altered in some way with the object of preserving it for the purposes of medical or scientific examination (emphasis supplied). The appellants appealed, contending that the judge had been wrong in law to direct the jury that the body parts they had taken were property and thus had misdirected them as to the issue of honesty. That Doodeward v Spence properly construed, provided no exception to the general common law rule that there was no property in a corpse or part thereof, was concerned with a two-headed fetus and not a corpse and with detinue and not theft. Ergo, the body parts taken were nobody's property. The Royal College of Surgeons had day-to-day control over them but not lawful possession due to the expiry of the Anatomy Act 1832. All entirely in accordance with the decision in Dobson and roundly dismissed. Giving the judgment of the Court, Lord Justice Rose said that the common law principle that there was no property in a body applied. It had stood for 150 years and only Parliament could change it. But here there had been some process for the purpose of medical and scientific examination. Lord Justice Rose did not leave matters there however. He noted that the Common Law did not stand still and that it was possible that a court in the future would hold that body parts were property even without the acquisition of different attributes, if for example they were required for use in an organ transplant. IS Insofar as Dobson and Kelly and Lindsay are inconsistent, the later decision is to be preferred. That said, the legal position remains far from clear. It seems that the extent and nature of any "differentiating" process will not be the only criterion the court will consider when deciding whether a body or a part is property. Other factors are likely to be the perceived desirability of the outcome of such a finding. Further, the circumstances in which the parts were obtained, whether they derive from a living or dead body, may be significant. It is thus regrettable that in neither Dobson nor Kelly was the important case of Moore v Regents of University of California 19 considered.
The Plaintiff, John Moore, sought to bring an action for the wrongful conversion of his bodily cells which had been extracted by his doctor in the course of treatment for his hairy-cell leukaemia at UCLA Medical Center between 1976 and 1983. He alleged that by August 1979, unbeknown to him, his physician, Dr Golde, and Golde's researcher Quan, had established a cell-line from his T-lymphocytes. In 1981, in conjunction with the University, a patent was applied, which was granted in 1984, for Golde and Quan as inventors of the cell-line and the Regents as the assignee of the patent which included various methods for using the cell-line to produce lymphokines which were the subject of commercial agreements for their vast exploitation. Moore claimed the Defendants' unauthorised use of his biological cells amounted to a legal conversion of his property and that he was entitled to damages reflecting the huge potential profits from their application. Though the courts all disapproved of Golde's concealment of his project and there were some dissenting judgments, Moore's claim for conversion of "his property" ultimately failed."
In the UK, patients' surplus or unwanted bodily fluids, tissues and bone has been traditionally used for pure or applied research, presumably teaching students on the basis of abandonment (or perhaps some kind of tacit, implied consent). To some extent the validity of this premise is supported by the decision in Dobson and Doodeward v Spence and it is not undermined by Kelly and Lindsay as all these cases along with Moore accept that the human body or parts of it are not prima facie to be regarded as property capable of ownership before they have been taken into possession and altered by medical or scientific staff. However, even "abandonment" of possessory rights and/or implied consent to dispose of such material will be subject to express and/or implied terms including confidentiality and its application for lawful and decent use which conform to societal norms. Using body parts to make handicrafts, e.g. skin for lampshades and human fetuses as earrings, may be held obscene, see R v Gibson [1990] 2 QB 619, CA and see Doodeward v Spence (above) .
However, this tradition, which requires patients or their next of kin to "contract out" of a system they may not know is operating (compare the Human Tissue Act 1961), squares poorly with New Labour's stated objectives for a more open society and modern NHS. It is surely time for all potential donor patients to be offered a simply drafted consent form for signature preferably before admission to hospital and for there to be open dialogue with patients where this is sought, not just in the UK but across Europe." Certainly this was the consensus at the 30th ECVAM Workshop" where the ethical, legal and practical problems arising from the use of human tissue for research were considered. Its Report, which is due out shortly, will offer practical guidance (including some sample forms) with a view to facilitating more effective use of human tissue for research and thereby reducing unnecessary animal experimentation.
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